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Discussion
A. H. Welsh
This collection of papers gathering and promot-
ing highly successful applications of Statistics is a
good antidote for anyone feeling somewhat defen-
sive about Statistics. The focus on the successful use
of Bayesian methods has produced a powerful and
stimulating set of stories; the Editors and Authors
are all to be congratulated on their successful efforts
to bring out the stories behind these analyses. The
papers are relatively short (as was required by the
Editors) and a good measure of their success is that
they both stand alone and motivate the reader to
follow up and read the original papers.
The article on the search for the wreckage of flight
AF 447 (Stone et al.) is fascinating. The descrip-
tion of the careful and detailed thinking about what
might have happened, the evaluation and inclusion
of relevant empirical evidence to quantify the possi-
ble scenarios and the final success of the analysis in
assigning substantial posterior probability to where
the wreckage was ultimately found are all inspir-
ing. Like many inspiring articles, it challenges us to
think about both the difficult issues of the partic-
ular problem considered and general issues about
the overall approach. I think a Bayesian analysis is
highly appropriate for this problem, but it is not so
easy to explain why and it is clear that, as always,
the analysis itself has to be done extremely well.
One motivation for doing a Bayesian analysis for
this problem (and one that is commonly articulated)
is that the event in question is unique so it is not
meaningful to think about replications. This is not
really convincing because hypothetical replications
are hypothetical whether they are conceived of for
an event that is extremely rare (and in the extreme
happens once) or for events that occur frequently.
Moreover, it turns out later that nine past crashes
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were deemed similar enough to be used to provide
information for constructing the prior, making it dif-
ficult to argue that the event really is unique.
Another widely used motivation for Bayesian
analysis is that it propagates the uncertainty cor-
rectly. This is true and important, but it is also true
that it propagates only the uncertainties that we de-
cide to include in the model. We make choices over
what uncertainties to include and we also make rela-
tively arbitrary choices which we subsequently treat
as fixed. For example, were the uncertainties in the
weights for the different scenarios or the chosen α
propagated through to the conclusion? As a prac-
tical matter, I do not believe we can or should try
to propagate all uncertainty, simply that we should
not get too carried away and forget about aspects we
have treated as certain. This highlights the fact that
the Bayesian approach is a tool that is extremely
useful for combining the quantitative information
we choose to use and are able to express in terms of
distributions but which, like any tool, needs to be
used well to be effective; the tool on its own does
not solve the problem but needs to be applied by
highly skilled people.
The four unsuccessful searches that preceded the
final, successful search highlight some of the issues.
They too used assumptions and information to se-
lect the search location. Presumably they did not
use a Bayesian analysis? If they did not (and it is
not really possible with the benefit of hindsight to
go back and redo this fairly), differences between
the particular techniques used may be outweighed
by differences in the information and beliefs that
fed into the analysis. For example, the fourth search
based on possible drift concentrated in a small rect-
angle relatively far from the actual crash site. Would
a Bayesian analysis based on the information used to
come up with that search rectangle have produced
different results? It is difficult to be sure from the
maps but it looks like a passive acoustic search ac-
tually covered the crash site but that the wreckage
was not discovered. We can interpret this as mea-
surement error or as using an incorrect prior. The
searchers tried to find the sonar beacons, not real-
izing that these had failed and were not operating.
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The successful search both allowed for this possi-
bility (at least by not ruling out that area as hav-
ing been previously searched) and, because so much
time had elapsed that the beacons could not have
been expected to still work, adopted different tech-
nology in the search. Had they adopted the belief
that the area had been searched so the wreckage
could not be there and built this into the prior, it
would not have been found. Thus, it was crucial to
adopt the correct beliefs to end up with the right re-
sult. The point is that the tool had to be used well
and the credit is due to the users rather than simply
the tool.
In their very interesting paper on managing Baltic
salmon, Kuikka et al. make the point that Bayesian
methods make it possible to combine “relevant data
from many sources.” The paper explicitly acknowl-
edges the role of politics in salmon management and
the need to combine empirical data with “data” that
is too difficult or expensive to ever be collected. The
word relevant is critical here since irrelevant data
may at best just increase uncertainty and at worst
lead to seriously wrong answers. The choice of what
is relevant or not depends ultimately on the user
and is not an automatic property of the approach.
Kuikka et al. also make the point that biologically
realistic models for salmon involve too many param-
eters to fit without using informative priors. This is
mentioned again in Carroll’s intriguing paper on di-
etary consumption; Bayesian computations can be
used to fit models that frequentist methods cannot
fit. Running a Bayesian computation will produce
numbers but, as in any computation, we need to
convince ourselves that the numbers are meaningful
before we use and interpret them. In particular, it is
important to understand clearly whether the model
is identifiable or not, whether the model is incor-
rect in some important way (so the computational
issues reflect lack of fit) and the extent to which
the prior is driving the analysis. The fact that these
questions are not easy to answer with complicated
models and high-dimensional parameter spaces does
not lessen the importance of trying. Identifiability is
important because it is resolved by using informa-
tive priors which regularize the likelihood and en-
able the model to be fitted; even vague priors can
be informative in this context. There is no problem
with using informative priors but we need to know
when the priors are informative, particularly when
they are so informative that the posterior is essen-
tially the prior. Conceptually, this may not be so
different from the frequentist approach of imposing
nonestimable constraints on the parameters. A dif-
ferent kind of identifiability issue arises in Bayesian
history matching (Vernon et al.) because it is pos-
sible that different scenarios or models can lead to
the same observable data, particularly when this is
a single slice in time. Here, finding matching simula-
tions seems only part of the really difficult scientific
problem being considered.
Another reason a model may be difficult to fit is
that it does not describe the data. Forcing it to “fit,”
for example, by switching to a Bayesian analysis,
may not be the best response. It is difficult to check
complicated models, particularly hierarchical mod-
els with latent variables, measurement error, missing
data, etc., but using an incorrect model may be a
concern when the model proves difficult to fit.
A challenging issue acknowledged in Carroll is the
issue of using survey weights in a Bayesian analy-
sis. We can think about this as a way of estimating
the likelihood by the pseudo-likelihood and then us-
ing this estimated likelihood in a regular Bayesian
analysis. This does involve a combination of design-
based and model-based approaches which require
different conditioning but, somewhat like approx-
imate Bayesian computation (ABC), it might be
viewed as a pragmatic approach to solving difficult
problems. It is not clear what the Bayesian costs
and benefits are; in frequentist analysis, Chambers
et al. (2012) show that pseudo-likelihood estimation
is less efficient than maximum likelihood estimation
so there is some loss of information. Constructing
the likelihood requires including all the design vari-
ables in the model. Aside from the fact that, in
contrast to the survey weights, the design variables
are not usually available to secondary analysts, the
study from which the data are taken (NHANES)
uses a complicated design (with several nested levels
of cluster sampling) which it would not be straight-
forward to incorporate into the model. Moreover,
making the model more complicated may increase
the computational difficulties of fitting the model.
The use of pseudo-likelihood in Bayesian analysis
definitely needs research into its meaning and con-
sequences before we can consider it with equanim-
ity.
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